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Introduction
The political business cycle theories propose that politicians -party alignment notwithstanding -implement expansionary policies before elections (Nordhaus 1975 , Rogoff and Sibert 1988 , Rogoff 1990 ). Many empirical studies have examined whether election-motivated politicians manipulate macroeconomic variables in pursuit of re-election. Politicians have been shown to increase current expenditure at the cost of public investment, increase public health and other social expenditure, and boost short-term GDP growth before elections. Governments sugarcoat the budget balance by means of creative accounting -that is, "below-the-line" operations such Election-motivated politicians may also manipulate figures that cannot be measured by macroeconomic variables. In electoral districts or other closely-knit jurisdictions where voters directly punish or reward political candidates, politicians may be expected to behave corruptly before elections. For example, interest groups lobby and bribe politicians to implement or refrain from implementing specific policies. Corruption in the public sector is expected to be especially pronounced before elections because interest groups know that politicians are keen to gratify the needs of their constituencies and may solicit bribes. Electoral motives have been shown to cause politicians to allocate public funds inefficiently (Finan and Mazzocco 2016) .
Politicians may want to buy votes before elections. On the other hand, corruption is not likely to increase before elections because voters dislike corrupt politicians. Empirical studies suggest that voters punish corrupt politicians. Using cross-sectional data for 35 countries, Krause and Mendez (2009) show that when the perceived level of government corruption increased, the total number of votes obtained by an incumbent decreased. The perceived level of government corruption was measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Goel and Mazhar (2015) measure corruption by alternative indices and do not arrive at the conclusion that voters punish corrupt politicians. Many other studies exploit micro-data on political scandals in individual countries such as Brazil, Germany, Spain, and the United States.
The evidence is mixed on whether incumbents suffer electoral consequences when involved in political scandals (see, for example, Costas-Pérez et al. 2012 , Ferraz and Finan 2008 , Hirano and Snyder 2012 , Kauder and Potrafke 2015 , Rudolph and Däubler 2016 . 1 Journalists enjoy revealing political scandals. In particular, before elections, journalists make an effort to reveal political scandals to jeopardize the election of promising challengers and/or entrenched incumbents. Politicians know that political careers can end if they get caught in political scandals. Thus, the extent to which elections influence corruption remains an empirical question.
Scholars have examined electoral corruption-cycles using regional data. A paper closely related to my study is Vadlamannati (2015 4 macroeconomic variables as well as variables that track "key governance related issues" (p.
15).
In Russia, perceived corruption was also pronounced before elections. 2 Sidorkin and Vorobyev (2018) find that corruption perceived by firms increased at the end of regional governors' terms. The dataset includes some 5000 firms in 37 Russian regions over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . The authors find that governors were especially active in corruption when they knew that their terms were about to expire and they would not be re-appointed. By contrast, when their re-appointment was likely, they were hardly inclined to participate in corrupt activities. Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2016) perception-based corruption indexes may influence the actual perception of corruption because of the media attention they receive, thus raising the possibilities that the indexes influence the very same perceptions on which they are based. This circularity reinforces perceptions of corruption, creating a vicious cycle between perception and fact. Therefore, the perception of corruption does not always reflect the reality or complexity of the actual level or experience of corruption within a country." 3 On the extent to which perceived and experienced corruption differ see Gutmann et al. (2015) . Other criticism includes Arndt and Omann (2006), Galtung (2006) , The Guardian (2013) , and Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) . However, studies such as Fishman and Miguel (2007) and DeBacker et al. (2015) suggest that perceived corruption as measured by the CPI was quite correlated with more objective corruption measures. In any event, the CPI is a very prominent measure for perceived corruption and has often been used in 6 empirical research on corruption. See, for example, Paldam (2002) , Méon and Sekkat (2005) , Aidt (2009 ), Bjørnskov (2012 , Vadlamannati and Cooray (2016) , Debski et al. (2018) .
One may well maintain that it matters when in a year -before or after elections -survey participants on perceived corruption are asked. When elections take place early in a year and the experts are asked after the elections, they might have in mind all the distress caused by the elections that recently took place. When the experts are asked before the elections, their answers may be confounded by media pushing potential scandals at the time of questioning. Ideally, I
would therefore like to consider the timing of the surveys on perceived corruption. Doing so is however not possible because the CPI is based on 13 sub indicators with different procedures for asking survey participants. What is more, surveying participants does not always take place at the same time in every country.
The CPI (2018) (2016) that uses machine learning techniques to identify democracies.
Elections
The baseline sample includes 137 country-year observations with parliamentary (lower house) and presidential elections (26 in 2012, 25 in 2013, 31 in 2014, 26 in 2015, and 29 in 2016) .
Every country in the sample experienced at least one parliamentary or presidential election. I 
Empirical Analysis

Empirical Specification
The baseline panel data model has the following form:
Perceived corruptionit = α Electionit + Ʃl γl Xit + ηi + εt + uit (1) where the dependent variable Perceived corruptionti describes the reversed CPI in country i in year t. The variable Electionti assumes the value 1 if a parliamentary election takes place in country i in year t and 0 otherwise. The vector X includes three control variables: real per capita GDP (in logarithms -inferences regarding the election effects do not change when I use real per capita GDP in levels), the political instability index (Kaufmann et al. 2010) , and government final consumption expenditure (as % of GDP). ηi and εt are fixed country and fixed year effects.
Per capita GDP and government expenditure have been shown to be negatively and political 8 instability to be positively correlated with corruption (Goel and Saunoris 2018 The results in section 3.3 will corroborate that early elections have a large effect on perceived corruption.
Real per capita GDP (log) has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (5), (6) and (8). The political instability index does not have the expected positive sign, but lacks statistical significance. The effect of political instability on perceived corruption (Goel and Saunoris 2018) seems to be driven by cross-country, rather than within-country variation. Final government expenditure (as % of GDP) does not turn out to be statistically significant as well, a result of the correlation with per capita GDP.
Regular and early elections
Elections may well be called early. Reasons for early elections include coalition compulsions (e.g., withdrawal of support by a coalition partner) or strategic considerations of an incumbent government when chances for re-election might become worse in the future. do not consider the scandals in Spain as having induced the early elections. Table 4 shows regression results for when I distinguish between early elections that were (not) called because of corruption of politicians and scandals. The results show that the effect of early elections called because of corruption of politicians and scandals is numerically large and statistically significant at the 1% level. In any event, the point estimate of the regular election variable is around 0.4 and statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1) to (5).
Timing of elections
The timing of elections may well be considered in some more detail. The coding proposed by Table 5 show that using the exact timing of the elections also suggests an electoral cycle. The point estimates of the Franzese election variable in Table   5 are larger than the point estimates of the classical election dummy variable in the baseline model; this is in line with the different scales of the election variables (the standard deviation of the Franzese election variable in Table 5 is 0.27; the standard deviation of the classical election year dummy variable is 0.45).
Another alternative to measure the timing of the elections is to include dummy variables for pre-election, election and post-election years. Corruption is expected to increase in election and pre-election years, but not (or less so when scandals have repercussions) in post-election years. The results in Table 6 confirm these expectations: the election year variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) to (5) and at the 10% level in column (6). The preelection and post-election year variables have a positive sign, but lack statistical significance.
Income thresholds
I have examined subsamples by income and OECD-membership. One the one hand, one may well expect more contested elections in high-income and OECD countries than in low-income and non-OECD countries. Electoral cycles in perceived corruption may therefore by driven by high-income and OECD countries. On the other hand, corruption is more pronounced in lowincome and non-OECD countries which, in turn, may give rise to also larger electoral cycles in perceived corruption in low-income and non-OECD countries. The results for subsamples suggest (not shown) that electoral cycles in perceived corruption occur in low-income and non-OECD countries. The effects lack statistical significance in in high-income and OECD countries.
Disentangling parliamentary and presidential elections
The baseline model considers both parliamentary and presidential elections. I also examine electoral cycles based on parliamentary and presidential elections separately. 5 When I focus on parliamentary elections only, the results suggest electoral cycles before parliamentary elections (Table 7) . When I focus on presidential elections only, the point estimate of the election year variable is positive but lacks statistical significance (Table 8) .
3.7 Alternative measure for political institutions I used the new data on political institutions by Bjørnskov and Rode (2018) that updates the data by Cheibub et al. (2010) . One may well want to use an alternative measure for democracies which will, in turn, give rise to a different sample. I employ the new democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2016) that uses machine learning algorithms for pattern recognition to identify democracies. 6 The binary index for democracies by Gründler and Krieger (2016) identifies some countries as democracies over the full period 2012-2016 which the index by Bjørnskov and Rode (2018) did not identify as democracies: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Lesotho, Liberia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, and Venezuela. In a similar vein, the binary index for democracies by 5 I focus on presidential elections with public votes; that is, I do not consider presidential elections in countries such as Germany where electoral delegates vote for the president. 6 On how the measurement of democracy influences the democracy-growth nexus see Gründler and Krieger (2018) . around 100 democracies corroborate findings based on regional variation in India and Russia (Vadlamannati 2015 , Mironov and Zhuravskaya 2016 , Sidorkin and Vorobyev 2018 ).
An important question is why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. I acknowledge that I do not disentangle the reasons here; and this is certainly a key task for future research. Firstly, it is conceivable that lobby groups drastically increase their activities by approaching and, ultimately, bribing politicians before elections. Employers' associations may want to prevent increases in business taxes, lobbyists acting on behalf of carbon-intense producers may want to avoid (increases in) carbon taxes, other lobbyists wish to receive subsidies, etc. Politicians may be less likely to resist the increasing numbers of attractive offers by lobbying groups before elections. Secondly, the CPI is based on experts'
ratings. The experts participating in the ratings tend to be more sensitive to the public sector in 14 election than non-election years because the media report on governmental issues quite frequently in election years. Thirdly, opposition parties, and especially the media, play an important role in perceived corruption in the public sector. Many political scandals leak out just a few months before elections. I conjecture that the timing of when political scandals become public is not exogenous. Opposition parties that wish to kick incumbent politicians out of office are very likely to make public information on political scandals available when potential damage is large. In a similar vein, journalists that do not support incumbent politicians are inclined to report on political scandals just before elections. In Italy, for example, many corruption scandals occurred in the regional health system: a rightwing newspaper was more active in reporting on leftwing politicians, and a leftwing newspaper was more active in reporting on rightwing politicians involved in corruption scandals before elections (Le Moglie and Turati 2018). Future research should investigate whether opposition parties and journalists hold back information on incumbents' political scandals and tend to report on such scandals immediately prior to elections instead.
Another avenue for research is to examine electoral cycles in real, not perceived corruption. Doing so requires, of course, to compile data on corruption cases, an admittedly ambitious undertaking. OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Column (6) excludes countries with early elections. OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Column (6) excludes countries with early elections. OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Column (6) excludes countries with early elections.
